Whence these objects and causes are deriv’d. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy. However instantaneous this change of the idea into the impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, though they may the person himself who makes them. But it is his musings on our aesthetic judgments that may provide the best example of a genuine standard of taste. But what is particularly interesting for our purposes is to consider how it figures as a standard for the experience of sentiments. So, reason has only an instrumental use.
Hume groups the emotions in general among the perceptions of the mind, although they also serve as motivations for acting and even for reasoning. Of the effects of custom. Of the causes of the violent passions. Of the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes. This differs from hate and other simpler passions, because the desire is unprovoked by any injury or even a desire to obtain some good for ourselves other than reaping pleasure from the comparison. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy.
Of the immateriality of the soul. Of beauty and deformity. For instance, that which produces pride when connected to self can produce love in another, as when the beautiful estate excites love in Elizabeth for Mr.
A Treatise of Human Nature Series by David Hume
Our opinions of all kinds are strongly affected by society and sympathy, and it is almost impossible for us to support any principle or sentiment, against the universal consent of every one, with whom we have any friendship or correspondence. Influences on Later Authors Hume’s influence on later authors may be most evident in those features of his approach that differ from previous treatments of the emotions and moral sense. From these we infer the passion: Sympathy vivifies that idea into an impression, that is, a passion, by borrowing from the ever-present, and lively sense of self.
The Treatisehowever, contains ample material to serve as a starting point. In this way, we learn to sympathize from a general point of view.
Of the reason of animals. Adam Smith seems to have taken some of the issues Hume raised about the normative standards for moral judgments particularly seriously in his Theory of the Moral Sentiments But Hume does not assume that sympathy produces exactly the same passion in us as we imagine in another, particularly because the transfer may alter the object of the passion.
But there is an impression constant and invariable. Agosta will appeal to a conception of sympathy, which fuses empathy and aesthetics to arrive dissertahion a conclusion. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. Thus, through sympathy, the role of the passions acquires more force as a way of understanding human behavior, moral evaluations and social interactions.
David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature (Second Edition) – David Hume – Oxford Scholarly Editions
Hume begins the passions by giving a trite example of what Good and Evil are. Like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Hume also considers our moral judgments to be directed at the voluntary actions of others, which are rooted in motivating emotions, especially insofar as they represent enduring dispositions, or character.
The association of ideas, according to Hume, is the principle by which we make an easy transition from one idea to another. Of the origin of justice and property. If, for instance, we come, through sympathy, to feel the unhappy passion of another, we may feel our own comparatively happy non-sympathetic passions all the more strongly. But ideas can borrow vivacity from other sources through the principles of association found in the imagination.
This new mood inclines him again to philosophy, and the Treatise proceeds to topics neglected in the first book, particularly the nature of our passions and sentiments and how they fit us for social life.
The General Point of View and Standards of Appropriateness for the Sentiments There is a great deal more to be said about how we construct the dkssertation point of view. Of curiosity, or the love of truth.
A Treatise of Human Nature Series
But Hume dissertatipn that the corrections provided by the general point of view are far-ranging, extending beyond the moral sentiments to the formation of aesthetic taste, and influencing even seemingly straightforward perceptual judgments.
Perhaps the most curious feature of pride is its indispensable relation to the idea of self.
The first dimension is dissrtation we are to consider the extent to which the effects of a trait are useful or agreeable. The cause of pride, consist first, of a belief concerning oneself, that one has a certain trait, and second, of an attitude of approbation or esteem for anyone who has the trait.
Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. However, Hume’s moral psychology also adds important elements to the analysis of the passions we have already seen. This requirement may disqualify some candidates on completely circumstantial grounds, even those who might make perfectly good judges under other circumstances.
Moral virtues will then turn out to be qualities of behavior and character that are either pleasurable e.